Waddington
WADDINGTON: Military in WW1 originally but with some limited civil activity in the 1930s. In WW2 military aerodrome later becoming a major RAF ‘V’ bomber airbase
NOTE: Based within the Lincolnshire AIAA (Area of Intense Aerial Activity), this detail shows how WADDINGTON fits in with five combined MATZ (Military Air Traffic Zone). An arrangement which is, (or was?), I believe, unique in the UK.
Military users: WW1: RFC/RAF Home Defence
Night Landing Ground for 38 & 90 Sqdns
RFC/RAF Training Squadron Station and Training Depot Station
51 Reserve Sqdn
1916 to 1919: RAF 23 Sqdn (operating no aircraft!)
82Sqdn (Armstrong Whitworth FK8s)
97 Sqdn (also with no aircraft)
105 Sqdn (various types probably including RE 8s)
117 Sqdn (various types including DH.9s)
123 Sqdn (various types)
203 Sqdn (also with no aircraft)
204 Sqdn (also with no aircraft)
Interwar years from 1937: 44 Sqdn (Hawker Hinds*, then Avro Ansons and Bristol Blenheims and later still, Handley Page Hampdens)
50 Sqdn (Hinds later Hampdens)
88 Sqdn (Hinds)
110 Sqdn (Hinds later Blenheims)
* There appears to a question about 44 Sqdn initially operating Hawker Hinds. Perhaps they flew the Hawker Hind when based at ANDOVER (HAMPSHIRE) before relocating here with Bristol 143M Blenheim 1s in June 1937?
WW2: RAF Bomber Command 5 Group
9 Sqdn (Vickers Wellingtons later Avro Lancasters)
44 Sqdn (Handley Page Hampdens then Lancasters) **
50 Sqdn (Hampdens, Avro Manchesters, Lancasters)
97 (Straits Settlements) Sqdn (Avro Manchesters)*
142 Sqdn (Fairey Battles)
207 Sqdn (Avro Manchesters) [Also operated initially as 12 OTU]
420 RCAF (Royal Canadian Air Force) Sqdn (Hampdens)
463 & 467 RAAF (Royal Australian Air Force) Sqdns (Avro Lancasters)
617 Sqdn (Lancasters)
* It appears quite possible that 97 Squadron were the first to operate the Avro Manchester.
The Squadron moved to CONINGSBY in March 1941.
** 44 Sqdn were the first to fly the Lancaster on operations, 2nd March 1942. The Squadron moved to DUNHOLME LODGE in May 1943.
A MIKE CHARLTON GALLERY
Note: These pictures from postcards were kindly sent by Mike Charlton who has an amazing collection. See, www.aviationpostcard.co.uk
The first picture is of interest as this Lancaster was, it seems, never a 'Gate Guardian' at WADDINGTON. I suspect the picture is of the BBMF (Battle of Britain Memorial Flight) Lancaster paying a visit here. If anybody can kindly offer advice, this will be most welcome.
Regarding the second picture I am only guessing, but would reckon it was taken in the 1930s?
The third picture was, of two 'V' bomber types, taken at "An Home Day" in 1958. The detail of the bomber in the foreground is a Vickers Valiant, and a Handley Page Victor is seen beyond.
Post 1945: RAF Bomber Command (Including the ‘COLD WAR’ Era until 1984)
9 Sqdn (Avro Lincolns then English Electric Canberras), later it seems known as IX Squadron when operating the Avro Vulcan B.2 from 1975 until 1982. IX Squadron later reformed at HONINGTON (SUFFOLK) as the first operational Panavia Tornado GR.1 squadron.
12 Sqdn (Avro Lancasters later Lincolns) It appears that 12 Squadron arrived here on the 26th July 1946 initially with Avro Lancaster Mk.1s and Mk.IIIs. They then re-equipped with the Avro Lincoln B.2 before moving to nearby BINBROOK in September 1946. A stay of being based here of just less than four months.
21 Sqdn (English Electric Canberras) It appears that 21 Squadron were based here flying the English Electric Canberra B.2 from the 26th May 1955 until 31st December 1957 – becoming disbanded.
27 Sqdn (Canberras) Also flying the English Electric Canberra B.2, it appears this squadron stayed here alongside 21 Squadron for exactly the same period and was also disbanded on the 31st December 1957.
44 (Rhodesia) Sqdn (Avro Vulcans) It seems this squadron first operated the Avro Vulcan B.1 here from the 10th August 1960 before being disbanded on the 21st December 1982, and by then flying the Vulcan B.2 - a much improved version of the type.
49 & 61 Sqdns (Avro Lincolns) This is where my research becomes very interesting. Over the years and from ‘so-called’ reputable sources, I have noted the existence here of these two squadrons. However, in the Wikipedia history of WADDINGTON, neither of these feature.
50 Sqdn (Lincolns, Canberras at BINBROOK and UPWOOD, then back here flying Vulcans). They were based here initially from the 26th January 1946 flying the Avro Lincoln B.2, being disbanded on the 31st January 1951. The squadron was reformed, as noted, flying English Canberras – presumably the bomber versions (?) from nearby BINBROOK in LINCOLNSHIRE, plus at a later date, UPWOOD (HUNTINGDONSHIRE). It appears that 50 Sqdn flew the Vulcan B.1, B.2 and B.2K from WADDINGTON before being disbanded on the 31st March 1984.
Note: As a stop-gap measure following on from the Falklands War, 50 Squadron operated Vulcans converted to tankers for roughly two years. I can recommend reading 'Vulcan Boys' by Tony Blackman for an account. It strikes me as being astonishing how quickly Avro converted the 50 Squadron Vulcans to tankers - in just five months. The first of which arrived in July 1982.
57 Sqdn (Lincolns, later Boeing B.29 Washingtons) It seems that this squadron flew the Avro Lincoln B.2 here from the 7th October 1946 until the 4th April 1951 before moving to MARHAM (NORFOLK) where they converted to the Boeing B.29 Washington B Mk.1. A type they returned to WADDINGTON with on the 4th June 1951. It then seems 57 Squadron was then posted to nearby CONINGSBY, still flying the Washington, on the 2nd April 1952.
61 Sqdn (Lancasters later Lincolns) This squadron started operations here from the 25th January 1946 with Lancaster Mk.1s and Mk.IIIs before converting to the Avro Lincoln B.2, the type flown when moved to WITTERING (NORTHAMPTONSHIRE) on the 6th August 1953. It might well be asked why the RAF top brass were so keen to retain the Avro Lincoln, (basically a modified Lancaster) in service in 1953 and beyond? What had happened, it appears, was that the RAF had to ‘leap-frog’ an intermediate generation of bombers, going from WW2 types directly to the ‘V-bomber’ stage, capable of delivering atomic weapons into targets within the Soviet Union. The first ‘V-bomber’ the Vickers Valiant, entered RAF service in 1955.
101 Sqdn (Avro Vulcans)
203 OCU [Operational Conversion Unit] (Avro Vulcans)
50, 83, 90 & 101 Sqdns (Avro Vulcans)
1998 snapshot: RAF Airborne Early Warning
8 Sqdn 4 x Boeing Sentry AEW 1
23 Sqdn 3 x Boeing Sentry AEW 1 (Including SOCU and disbanded in 2009)
RAF Reconnaissance
51 Sqdn 2 x Nimrod R 1 (Later increased to three Nimrods)
2011 snapshot: RAF Combat Support 2 Group
5 (Army Co-operation) Sqdn ( Raytheon ASTOR/Sentinel R1s)
8 Sqdn (Boeing E-3 Sentrys)
13 Sqdn (UAV/MQ-9 Reapers)
14 Sqdn (Beechcraft Shadow R1s)
39 Sqdn (UAV/MQ-9 Reapers) These were at Creech AFB in Nevada during 2011 and due to relocate here from 2011 to 2012
51 Sqdn (Nimrod R1s) The Nimrod was due to phased out by June 2011 and replaced by (Boeing?) RC135W Rivet Joints – the first arriving in November 2013
54 (Reserve) Sqdn Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance
(ISTAR) OCU (Operational Conversion Unit)
56 (Reserve) Sqdn Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance
(ISTAR) OEU (Operational Evaluation Unit)
92 Sqdn Tactics and Training Wing (Air Warfare Centre)
Flying club/school: 1959. RAF Waddington Popular Flying Group
Location: W and adjacent to A15, E of A607, E to SE of Waddington, 4 nm south of Lincoln
Period of operation: 1916 to 1919. Reopened in March 1937 to present day
Site area: WW1: 350 acres 1509 x 1143
NOTE:This map is reproduced with the kind permission of Pooleys Flight Equipment Ltd. Copyright Robert Pooley 2014.
Runways: WW2: Till 1943 grass (Details?)
03/21 1829x46 hard 07/25 1280x46 hard
16/34? 1280x46? hard
These three runways were laid down, or at least finished, in 1943. However, Mr Hollis and Mr Willis note that they were later extended to:
03/21 2514x46 hard 07/25 1829x46 hard
16/34? also 1829x46 hard
1990/2000: 03/21 2743x61 hard (Became 02/20 later)
Again in the ‘official’ records Steve Willis and Barry Hollis say they recorded for their ‘Military Airfields’ books is another minor cock-up. The third runway they record, (magnetic heading 256), is actually the opposite heading for the second runway they mention which is 07/25 of course. According to the map published the third runway is about 16/34 but seeming to be somewhat shorter than the 1280x46 hard they say it is. Here yet again any serious attempt to record accurate detail when judged against the obvious evidence available has been ignored. This is not to say I blame Steve Willis and Barry Hollis for being negligent, far from it, and mistakes will occur, and the fact being I have found their book to be invaluable. A general point I’d like to make is that far too much of aviation research has been just ‘blindly’ copying other peoples work, not that I’m accusing Mr Hollis and Mr Willis of doing this. Official records especially are very suspect regarding accuracy and anybody using them as reference material without always questioning the basic premises is a tad foolhardy. In this respect I have tried very hard to redress the balance knowing my work certainly isn’t perfect - …but it is a start.
SOMETHING TO BE CONSIDERED
For most of my life I had always thought that V-Bomber crews would have been an elite in the RAF and accorded considerable status and privileges. Any why not? They were after all expected, if push came to shove in the Cold War, to lead the UK into a war that would obliterate most of Europe and Russia, and, I suppose, put paid to civilisation as we know it, for much of the survivors elsewhere in the world.
How wrong can you be? Below is an account by a V-bomber crew member, preferring to remain anonymous of course, that explains the realities he faced serving on a Vulcan Squadron during those years.
NOTES: Venue (7th June 1933) for Alan Cobham’s No.Tour of the UK?
A GALLERY IN SEPTEMBER 2018
Note: Pictures by the author.
WADDINGTON BECOMES A BOMBER BASE
In his excellent book Vulcan 607 Rowland White gives this brief description: “RAF Waddington sits on Lincolnshire heights, five miles south of the county’s cathedral city. Carved from flat, well-drained farmland during the First World War, it wasn’t until the RAF’s rapid expansion in the late 1930s that Waddington became a significant bomber base. Although operations were flown on the first day of the Second World War, it wasn’t an auspicious start. The Handley Page Hampdens of 44 and 50 Squadrons failed to identify the German fleet and returned to Waddo after dropping their bombs into the North Sea. With the introduction of Lancasters in 1941, things improved dramatically and the contribution of her squadrons to the war effort was a substantial one. By 1956, with the formation of 230 Operational Conversion Unit, she became home to the RAFs first Vulcans.”
NOT A VERY GOOD START
What is not often generally recognised today is how hopelessly inadequate RAF Bomber Command was, even in 1940. I’d like to quote this from Bomber Crew by John Sweetman. “The Air Officer Commanding in Chief (C-in-C) Bomber Command, Air Chief Marshal Sir Edgar Ludlow Hewitt, drew attention to the serious deficiences in his force, emphasised that a daylight campaign against Germany as foreseen pre-war was out of the question, and paid the price”. Plain speaking and honesty are very much abhorred by the British establishment, which is still very much the case today of course.
Be that as it may here comes the crunch. “On 4 April 1940, Air Marshal Charles Portal replaced him. The new commander had only thirty-three operational squadrons at his disposal. Almost exactly half had Battles or Blenheims, leaving just seventeen with Wellington, Whitley and Hampden ‘heavy’ bombers with which to attack the German war industries.” A bit like trying to crack a walnut with a teaspoon I suppose? However, it is often overlooked that the performance and capabilities of the Wellington, Whitely and Hampden, compared quite favourably with the German bombers of that era. The two main issues being lack of operational combat experience for the crews and especially, of course, lack of numbers.
But - did anybody have any reasonable cause to envisage how, and to what extent, the Germans had put so much emphasis on air superiority, especially using bombers? Without any doubt all the signs were there, especially when the Luftwaffe used the Spanish civil war as a practise session. It does now appear the people in power had more than enough information warning them that the Nazi regime was on the war path – which was mostly ignored at the highest levels, perhaps because, with the British Empire still in place, they felt invulnerable?
Or, was this actually the case? This has been the most common story I have heard or read about over the years. However, since researching this Guide this version of events now looks far too simplistic, the fact being that many people in high places knew exactly what was going on in Germany and took fairly drastic steps to redress the balance. Needless to say nobody can create a powerful and effective air force virtually overnight. It takes quite a long time to get aircraft designed, built, tested and ready for action. Likewise with crews and the provision of aerodromes, armaments etc, etc. And, in the mid 1930s, British industry was still in the depths of the ‘Great Depression’ as were most of the working class population.
DECLARING WAR
What I struggle to understand is the approach the British had to declaring war on Germany, headed up by the Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain. Let’s see if I understand the basics? By declaring war I’d have thought you do so from a position of military strength, having an ‘odds-on’ chance of winning? Our Army obviously wasn’t up to the job, nor our Air Force. Our Navy on the hand was considered pretty much dominant in those days, but not much use against a mainly land-locked country, which of course, Germany is.
I can easily understand why we British should have prepared to defend ourselves against invasion, despite having a mostly German royal family at that time. The Nazi regime wouldn’t have suited them one bit we are now told. The truth is, as usual, quite a bit more complicated as many members of British aristocracy were feted by the Nazis. And, to a large extent, it seems Hitler himself had imagined that Britain would be a natural ally.
WHY SEPTEMBER 1939?
What I cannot understand is why we declared war when we did? I now think the invasion of Poland was more of a convenient excuse and not a valid reason. Britain has never had any particularly strong ties with Poland as far as I can see. And yes, I do appreciate something about the political allegiances that appertained at that time within Europe, but hadn’t anybody pointed out the military practicalities? The UK was a sitting duck – or was it?
It does now seem an amazing stroke of luck that the utterly ruthless, clearly planned, and professionally executed German Blitzkeig invasions which had worked so well up to that point, were suddenly impotent, simply because a rather small strip of water, the English Channel, intervened. They could send their bombers across of course but the Germans couldn't put boots (and tanks) on the ground immediately afterwards.
THE INVASION MYTH
If the German forces had attacked Britain at dawn, as per usual, we wouldn’t have stood a chance – or so it is mostly believed, and I for one had totally swallowed this story. I say ‘story’ because that is exactly what it was, a story or myth, and one which had no basis in fact - I now realise. Plus of course the threat of invasion was exactly what the British government propaganda machine needed and they were so successful, the myths they spread endure even today. Plus of course the film industry, for just one example, simply loves to ignore fact in favour of myth and legend.
The truth of the matter now seems very much different given both fifteen years research and the opportunity to meet some exemplary historians along the way. What is needed is to differentiate between ‘threat’ and likelihood. The threat was definitely real enough, but the likelihood so remote it can be virtually discounted. To try and put the case simply the Germans had indeed set about amassing a huge invasion force, that is a fact. And this was the threat. However they needed three prerequisites before the plan could be actioned. The first was air supremacy, the second, rarely mentioned, was naval supremacy and the third, virtually ignored these days, was to remove very quickly and as far as possible the threat of any ground based and/or army retaliation. The latter very difficult to achieve even in part, as tanks don’t float too well.
That last point is crucial for any seaborne, or for that matter airborne invasion. So much is made of the ‘Battle of Britain’ being won by the RAF and this is simply NOT correct. It would perhaps be far better to see this conflict as ‘The Battle of South East England’. What the RAF fighters did do was convince the Germans they would not have total aerial supremacy – and that was very important indeed.
COULD AN INVASION HAVE SUCCEEDED?
In the initial stages of a classic Blitzkreig invasion, aerial supremacy was virtually irrelevant. It would hardly affect the actual invasion if carried out at night to arrive at dawn, but would be important – but certainly not crucial, after the landings. The coastal defences in south east England especially were very formidable indeed and although we had few really big guns these are not very effective at close range. No other country in Europe, which were so quickly overrun, had this immense advantage. And indeed, as witnessed a few years later in the D-Day landings when the Germans had virtually no air and sea forces to assist, it is very difficult and costly in lives to invade a well defended coastline.
BUT, how many Germans would have even reached our shores? Impossible to say of course although one thing does seem clear - probably not so many. In addition to our shore defences in 1940 the Royal Navy was still totally dominant in the waters around the British Isles, the issue of German battleships being superior to British battleships is a side issue and indeed, they more than probably would not have been deployed in this scenario. Battleships do not fair well in shallow and narrow coastal waters and would have been very vunerable to attack from the air and especially torpedo carrying lighter vessels. If the figures available are reliable, and they appear more than good enough for this argument, the Royal Navy had available about 35 cruisers (66 worldwide), the Kriegsmarine 7. The RN also had about 95 destroyers (184 worldwide), the Kriegsmarine 7. Perhaps as equally important the RN also had about 56 corvettes and 46 escort/patrol vessels to call on.
The Royal Navy at that time had the reputation for being utterly fearless, which actually cost them dearly in WW2 and in many cases needless sacrifice. Having no knowledge of naval warfare strategy I have no idea how effective British cruisers might have been against German cruisers? My guess being they would have been very effective indeed given a five to one ratio, and attacking in mid-channel or even as the invasion force set sail? However, this I do know, the crews of destroyers and even smaller torpedo equipped vessels were the pit bull terriers of the Navy and would not hesitate to attack even battleships. I also have every reason to believe the crews of the smaller Royal Naval vessels would have been ferocious and fearless. Can you imagine the carnage if that lot were set loose amongst a fleet of invasion barges?
What we must surely need to bear in mind was that the German military machine was not stupid. Some of their government and some (only some) of the their leading military people can now easily be accussed of being stupid, (isn’t hindsight wonderful – I wish I could bottle it and make a fortune), but even the buffoon/genius Hitler eventually realised it wasn’t 'a goer'.
We British do tend to over-inflate our importance in world affairs and this was very much the case in those days. I suspect the truth was that conquering the British Isles was a pretty low priority to the German ‘Grand Plan’ – we had virtually nothing they needed and indeed were mostly a pain in their arse to put it bluntly. Indeed, most of the territory occupied by the British Empire was probably not of much interest to German imperial designs because so much of it was seen as being virtually worthless.
Being a tad mischievous, it was different for the USA of course, as they had (their old establishment) with a grudge still to settle against the British with whom they had won a war of independence. In this respect Lend/Lease was a perfect weapon with which to assist bankrupting the British. But that is another subject.
TWO OTHER ASPECTS
This seems as good enough a place as any to mention the largely ignored factor in WW2 of what is now termed friendly fire which, coupled with the training regimes, accounted for so many fatalities. Coupled with the findings of the Butt Report, (see below), perhaps we can only wonder at what kept driving these airmen as the majority were taking totally unexceptable risks in return for achieving very little.
The Butt Report in 1941 showed that only one in five of British bombers got within five miles of dropping their bombs on the target! It is easy to blame the individual aircrews but the real truth is that the RAF had singularly failed to address, since WW1, the training, techniques and equipment needed to perform this role. I think the story of the ‘background boffins’ who eventually managed to equip Bomber Command with the effective devices needed should now be much more loudly trumpeted. As many now claim, the entire outcome of the ‘War in the Air’ was mostly won by boffins. This is, without any doubt absolutely correct in principal, but few if any boffins flew through the flak, endured night fighter attacks etc, to see how their gizmos worked or gained much advantage. And, we musn't forget, some gizmos actually gave the enemy a big advantage, such as backward looking radar which German night fighters could home in on.
A SAD REALITY - FRIENDLY FIRE
The cruel facts are that we’ll never know how many of our bombers were shot down by a combination of ill-trained and frightened ‘trigger-happy’ RAF aircrew, the Royal Navy and Army ack-ack. In fact, so much so that I would now say the real bravery of RAF aircrew in Bomber Command was in being prepared to survive the RAF regimes, plus Navy and Army so-called defences, let alone fight the enemy!
So many people bang on today about our ariel supremacy over England in WW2, radar being a huge advantage etc, but to give just one isolated example, how did the Avro Manchester L7314 from 207 Sqdn WADDINGTON get shot down over WOLLASTON in Northamptonshire, (hardly the enemy home ground), by a Beaufighter from 25 Sqdn WITTERING? There are so many similar examples plus our aircraft succumbing to our ack ack etc that I sometimes wonder if the biggest mistake the Germans made was in flying their aircraft? It almost seems that if they’d left them grounded for a year or so the British forces might well have put paid to themselves anyway! An exaggeration of course but only to make an angry point. And who exactly coined the term ‘Friendly Fire’? I’m with Jeremy Clarkson in one respect when he remarked about something or other, “They should be dragged out and shot before their family”.
THE MANCHESTER – LANCASTER STORY
Many excellent accounts exist but for brevity one of the best I have discovered is from the authors of ‘TOLLERTON, an airfield for Nottingham’, from which I quote: “Along with the Supermarine Spitfire and the de Havilland Mosquito, (My note: Don’t forget the Hawker Hurricane please), the Avro Lancaster has gone down in history as one of the truly outstanding aircraft of its generation, although its advent came about more by luck than judgement. Some aircraft, such as the Spitfire and Mosquito, came straight off the drawing board and were obviously exceptional aircraft from the moment they first took to the air. The Lancaster on the hand was born out of the failure of another aircraft. That other aircraft was the Avro Manchester.”
(My note: It think this is important to realise. At this period the United Kingdom was pretty much in a parlous position to oppose the Nazi regime in Germany. What was needed were highly effective heavy bombers and the best brains in the best companies were asked to provide answers. The Short Stirling was really quite good as the first of the breed, and the Handley Page Halifax was much better. What we need to remember is that nobody at that time, in the UK, had developed a heavy bomber which could prove effective. Shorts and Handley Page decided four engines were needed and they both had a pedigree in producing such types for long range civil airliners and flying boats, so they knew what they were talking about to a large extent. Avro on the other hand, (and I believe I am correct?), hadn’t designed and built anything bigger than their Anson! Against the grain they trusted Rolls-Royce to produce an engine, the ‘Vulture’ which could compete with two engines against the other types with four).
“The Manchester was designated a ‘heavy’ bomber even though it had two engines, namely Rolls-Royce Vultures. It was these engines that were to prove the Achilles heel of the new aircraft. Great things were expected from the prototype, which first flew on the 25 July 1939, (My note: from RINGWAY, CHESHIRE), so much so that large numbers had already been ordered straight from the drawing board. However, after the aircraft’s maiden flight the omens were not good. The power developed by the two Vulture engines was nowhere near as great as had been predicted. The aircraft also proved unstable in flight and difficult to fly.”
(My note: Just think about it, both Avro and Rolls Royce had abjectly failed on all counts but Avro was given a second chance to get it right! Looking back it would appear a very ‘chancy’ decision to even trust Avro to perform better. But then, a lot was at stake, not least the situation mentioned below).
“Even before this test flight though, an order for two hundred Manchesters had been placed with the manufacturers A.V.Roe, so desperate was the Air Ministry to replace the increasingly obsolescent Hampdens, Blenheims and Whitleys.”
(My note: One can easily imagine the faceless officials who had gambled on the Manchester now crapping themselves and really giving Avro a very hard time. It might well be imagined what was going on at board level in Avro. They’d obtained a major contract which could propel the company towards becoming a major player in the large aircraft business, and they’d blown it….BIG TIME! I suspect that not too many companies, faced with such a calamity, could have turned this around.)
“Modifications were made to the prototype and a second aircraft subsequently flew on 25 October 1939. Great secrecy surrounded these flights and no mention of the aircraft was made to the press. The first two Manchesters were sent to 207 Squadron at Waddington in November 1940 where they underwent intensive flight evaluation; but the Vulture engines continued to be remarkably unreliable. Since it was impossible to keep the aircraft airborne with only one engine, this unreliability did not endear the Manchesters to aircrew….” The Royal family bless them, no less than the King and Queen, typically unable to determine if they were supporting a proper and worthwhile endeavour, arrived at Waddington on the 9th January 1941 to applaud the Avro Manchester and 207 Squadron when the type was first unveiled to the public.
Barely four months later the type was grounded. One option was to replace the two Vulture engines with two Bristol Centauras engines. “By the time that it was decided to replace the two Vulture engines with the four Merlins over two hundred Manchesters had already been delivered to the RAF.” What might not be widely known is that the first Merlin four-engine version was the Manchester Mk.III. First flown on the 9th January 1941 and I’m pretty certain it was from RINGWAY (CHESHIRE).
WAS THE LANCASTER SUCH A BRILLIANT AIRCRAFT?
Perhaps not readily understood today is the way in which a ‘classic’ bomber such as the Lancaster was often woefully inadequate for the task initially. In his excellent book Bomber Crew John Sweetman gives several examples. From the log book of Gordon Carter such as, on the 3rd February 1943: ‘Gun turrets frozen, compass U/S, undercarriage locked up.’ They made a belly landing back at base on a grass ‘runway’ and survived. The next night in another Lancaster recording, ‘Guns frozen, the airspeed and rate of climb indicators failed and the DR compass became U/S’. Quite frankly the Lancaster (and of course the lesser performing Stirling and Halifax) were not fit for purpose by our standards today, far from it – but these airmen had no choice. There was no time available to prove and develop the type before entering combat. Plus, as mentioned before, the four-engine heavy bomber was a totally new concept, nothing like these new designs had existed before.
On a more positive note it appears 44 (Rhodesia) Sqdn based here were the first to fly the Lancaster operationally, which, despite its initial failings did prove to be the most formidable bomber type in the European air war. What the Lancaster could do was carry a heavy bomb load, double that of the American Boeing B.17 Fortress for example, and in modified versions much more. (See SCAMPTON for more info on the ‘Lanc’). The date for the first Lancaster operations is, it appears, the 2nd March 1942.
NOTE: See BARDNEY, (also in LINCOLNSHIRE), for why 9 and 44 Squadrons left, (after the hard runways were installed), and why 463 and 467 RAAF Squadrons moved in.
WHY THE CONTINUOUS MOVES?
This subject is something I have banged on about elsewhere and over the fifteen years or so of research, (up to this point in 2014), I still cannot find a satisfactory answer. To move a squadron is, as I still understand it, not just a matter of flying some aircraft from one place to another. A large part of the whole establishment (mechanics, admin, cooks etc) required to support a squadron of aircraft has to move too. This is, I should point out, a quite different matter from ‘detachments’ wherebyaircraft are stationed elsewhere for usually a fairly brief period.
Given a situation as serious as WW2 it might be thought that a general rule for the military would be to conserve and husband resources? Obviously, in a war there are many justified reasons to move squadrons around for strategic reasons such as opening up a new campaign, etc, etc. But no, the RAF had a policy of always hindering operational effectiveness at every opportunity. For some examples:
9 Squadron moved here in August 1942, flying Vickers Wellingtons, and were moved to BARDNEY, also in LINCOLNSHIRE, in April 1943. Roughly 10 miles away.
97 Squadron reformed here in February 1941, flying Avro Manchesters, and were moved to CONINGSBY, also in LINCOLNSHIRE, in March 1941. Roughly 16 miles away.
142 Squadron moved here on the 15th June 1940, flying Fairey Battles, before moving to BINBROOK, also in LINCOLNSHIRE, on the 3rd July. So, a stay of nineteen days and then moving about 23 miles away. And, this was going on just prior to the height of the so called ‘Battle of Britain’ which was of course nothing of the kind as around two thirds of the RAF in the UK had no involvement whatsoever.
207 Squadron reformed here on the 1st November 1940, flying the Avro Manchester, and moved to BOTTESFORD on the LEICS/LINCS border on the 17th November 1941, about 19 miles away.
420 (RCAF) Squadron were formed here on the 19th December 1941, tasked with flying the already obsolete Handley Page Hampden. They were then moved to SKIPTON-on-SWALE in YORKSHIRE on the 7th August 1942, about 81 miles away, and, if anything, making them fly just that bit further to engage the enemy.
463 Squadron (RAAF) formed here on the 25th November 1943, flying Avro Lancasters before being moved to SKELLINGTHORPE, also in LINCOLNSHIRE on the 3rd July 1945 and about 6 miles away.
467 Squadron (RAAF) were here from the 13th November 1943, flying Lancasters, and were moved to METHERINGHAM, LINCOLNSHIRE, on the 15th June 1945, also about 6 miles away from WADDINGTON.
So, can anybody please explain to me the big advantage to the war effort of moving these squadrons around over such footling distances? I really would like to know as this was a major strategy that the RAF set much store by. It is also perhaps interesting to note that the prime locations in East Anglia, best suited to attack the German stronghold, had been mostly reserved for the USAAF even before the USA had ‘officially’ decided to get engaged in the European war.
THE INFAMOUS AUGSBURG RAID – OPERATION “MARGIN”
One can only wonder how the crews of 44 (Rhodesia) Squadron based here, and 97 Squadron based at WOODHALL SPA, (also in LINCOLNSHIRE and roughly 13 miles away, must have felt, taking off at around 3pm in their Lancasters on the 17th April 1942, having learnt their target was the MAN diesel engine factory (for U-boats) in Augsburg. Each squadron provided a Flight of six aircraft – so, just twelve bombers. Both Flights, it is claimed, had practised low flying for a week. So, obviously, more than enough time to become expert in the techniques and art of very low flying! Or it is according to the opinion of some fool or fools employed in RAF Bomber Command planning at senior officer levels.
It is claimed that thirty Douglas Boston medium bombers and a large Fighter Command effort were sent to targets in northern France as a decoy. Why? Probably nobody knows and it was of course a complete waste of time and effort, with one Boston lost.
This target site is in Bavaria, southern Germany, about 32 miles (53 kms) north west of Munich. It surely must have seemed they were going on a suicide raid, as were so many made ,by RAF planners in WW2. It appears the crews were instructed to fly the route at about 50 feet above the ground; clearly an instruction given by somebody who today would be declared insane and removed from contact with the public. But, in those days a serving RAF senior officer! This target is roughly double the distance the distance 617 Squadron had to fly to attack the dams in the Ruhr region, and they had weeks of low-level flight training.
A PREDICTABLE RESULT?
Flying at low level in daylight would of course attract a great deal of attention, and not just from the military either. Perhaps predictably four of the first Flight of 44 Squadron Lancasters were shot down before reaching Augsburg. The two remaining Lancasters dropped just four 1,000lb bombs each and one was hit by flack and crash landed killing three of the crew. So, only one of the 44 Squadron Lancasters survived the raid and returned to base. For his part, flying the only Lancaster of 44 Squadron to survive the raid, and as the pilot, Squadron Leader John Dering Nettleton was awarded a VC, flying the Lancaster R5508. It is claimed he says, that he only survived due the German fighters running short of fuel and the daylight fading.
Of the twelve Lancasters who set off on the raid, seven were shot down with 49 aircrew being lost to the war effort. Only two of the first Flight of six Lancasters bombed the target whereas five of the second Flight managed to bomb the factory. Apart from Nettleton’s VC other aircrew were awarded DFCs, DFMs and a DSO. So, you might well imagine that the raid was viewed as a success?
According to information provided by Wikipedia: “Post-war analysis indicated damage was minor; five of the bombs dropped had failed to explode. Eight machine tools were destroyed out of a total of 2,700, and five cranes out of 558. Of the 84 RAF airmen, 37 died and twelve were taken as prisoners of war.” This was a terrible price to pay for so little in return, but who exactly had imagined such a puny force could succeed – especially over this distance in daylight? Nearly two years later the picture was entirely different.
Once again from Wikipedia: “ In a final Big Week mission (#235), the Eight Air Force bombed the Augsburg Messerschmitt works during the day on 25 February 1944. That night (25/26 February 1944), RAF Bomber Command followed with 594 aircraft and completely destroyed the centre of Augsburg. 21 RAF aircraft, 3.6% of the force was lost (at least four due to collision).” It must of course be borne in mind that despite this horrific level of destructionbeing meted out on German towns and cities on a very regular basis, that still Hitler and most (or at least many) of his senior staff – refused to surrender. I suppose that the commanders of the Allied forces must have been wracking their brains to try and imagine exactly what was needed to force them to come to their senses.
The sad reality was that even on this scale, bombing alone did not produce the expected result. Rather it was Russian infantry and armour quite literally blasting a path into Berlin that finally led to Hitler committing suicide in his bunker and the remnants of the Nazi machine only then accepting defeat. And, of course, it wasn’t just Germany that now lay in ruins. A huge swathe of destruction had laid waste to many hundreds of towns and cities, applied by both sides over the previous five years.
WAS THE BOMBING CAMPAIGN JUSTIFIED?
It appears that these days a considerable number of younger people, and not just Germans, consider it wasn’t – but, sadly, they obviously haven’t bothered to make even a rudimentary study of the history of this conflict. Bombing, and especially area bombing, was the only means available to attack Germany and therefore every bomb dropped was totally justified – and not least because it was the Germans who had implemented this utterly ruthless and indiscriminate form of warfare – in World War One actually, albeit on a small scale.
The Civil War in Spain during the 1930s had enabled the Nazi regime to practise applying the technique of bombing the civilian population and this knowledge formed a central pillar in the devastatingly effective ‘Blitzkreig’ strategy. What also tends to be conveniently overlooked is that towards the end stages of WW2 the Nazi regime had unleashed both the V.1 pilotless' 'flying bomb' and the utterly horrific V.2 rockets. Plus, until troops arrived on the ground, the bombing of Germany was pretty much the only method of taking the war into the German homeland.
On a personal note I am, having worked throughout Europe for forty years, a huge fan of the EU concept – and indeed consider myself a ‘European’ rather than just a British subject, something I feel very proud of. And yes, I do accept that the system is often highly flawed and riddled throughout by dubious if not seriously criminal elements – allegedly! But, it remains my belief that this system has, without too much doubt (?), and after over two thousand years of mainstream European history enduring it; the EU concept has finally ended the prospect of large scale warfare ever happening again - in most of western Europe that is.
THE PRESERVATION OF ARTEFACTS
LACK OF SUPPORT?
One thing you cannot accuse the Air Ministry about, (later Ministry of Defence), is inconsistency in having any respect whatsoever for the history of supporting the RAF in terms of preserving aircraft types. Quite frankly, it really does appear that these desk-bound minions, seemingly of restricted intellect, knowledge, humanity and lacking other decent human qualities - couldn’t give a toss. Others might say I am being far too kind and generous in describing them in such glowing terms!
It has, as far as I can see, been the dedicated efforts of a very wide variety of people, both within the RAF and various civilian groups, to whom we owe a sincere debt of gratitude for being able to see most types operated by the RAF in museums and quite often still flying. For example, if you read Jarrod Cotters book, The Battle of Britain Memorial Flight, it would appear nigh on miraculous that the Lancaster PA474 has survived. One episode in the history of this aircraft seems apposite: “In 1965 Wing Commander M. A. D’Arcy, the Commanding Officer of 44 (Rhodesia) Squadron, the first unit to be equipped with Lancasters, which was by then flying Avro Vulcans from RAF Waddington, asked permission for a Lancaster (PA474) to be transferred into the care of the squadron. Part of the deal would see the aircraft stored inside a hangar at Waddington and it was agreed that a start could be made on the restoration work required for its eventual display in the museum.”
“A search was started and eventually a Lancaster was located at RAF Henlow.” This turned out to be PA474 and to cut a very long story short, after a supreme effort by many experienced technicians, (many of whom had worked on Lancasters in WW2), PA474 was flown from HENLOW to WADDINGTON on the 18th August 1965. A rather telling story then emerges when several highly capable and influential people, who believed in returning the Lancaster to flying status found that the prospect – “… foundered initially in MOD, where financial approval was slow in forthcoming.”
It seems well worth recording that all ‘higher ranks’ concerned in getting this Lancaster airworthy pay tribute to Flight Lieutenant Leach and Chief Technician Terry, the latter of whom it is said, “He did more than anyone to get the Lanc into flying shape.”
THE AVRO VULCAN
WADDINGTON was selected as one of the bases for the Avro Vulcan ‘V-bomber’ and it was a most extraordinary design. Perhaps even more astonishing is the the fact that the design team led by Roy Chadwick went directly from the Lancaster and its derivatives, to this design. As Rowland White points out in his book Vulcan 607: “The Avro Vulcan was conceived in the reign of King George VI as a nuclear bomber…to meet an ambitious 1947 Air Staff Requirement for an aircraft that could cruise at 500 knots at an altitude of 50,000 feet for nearly 4,000 miles to deliver a ‘special bomb’.”
At that point, in 1947, the RAF had; “….a piston-engined bomber force barely capable of flying 2,000 miles at 200 knots and 20,000 feet.” Whilst getting it so wrong with the Avro Tudor airliner, (a type plagued with problems), in which Roy Chadwick died in a totally avoidable crash if only the flying controls hadn’t been connected ‘back-to-front’, his legacy with the Vulcan went from strength to strength. The Vulcan being, without much doubt, the very finest of the three ‘V-bombers’ – all three of which, (the other two being the Vickers Valiant and Handley Page Victor), were exceptional in all being very high-performing designs.
“Chadwick’s solution was radical: a giant delta, her nose and cockpit extending forward of the triangular planform like the head and neck of a pterodactyl. It’s hard to appreciate the impact this imposing combination of power and purpose must have made when she first roared overhead, powered by four of the same Rolls-Royce engines that would be developed to propel Concorde through the sound barrier. In 1952 – two years before the last Lancaster was retired by the RAF – she much have looked like she’d soared straight out of the pages of ‘Dan Dare’ in the Eagle comic.” I wholeheartedly agree with this as, in 1952 and aged five, I was already a dedicated reader of the Eagle.
“And the public weren’t the only ones who seemed left behind by Britain’s most advanced jet bomber. When the test pilot Roly Falk wowed the crowds at the Farnborough air show, ‘the pin-striped pilot’ did so wearing a tweed suit and tie.” Isn’t learning this so refreshing? So very nice to hear that Roly Falk felt no requirement to dress himself up in full military combat garb for a low level public demonstration. “After entering service in 1956, the Vulcan bore most of the weight of Britain’s independent nuclear deterrent and did so convincingly.”
SKYSHIELD
This was an exercise with astonishing results, and, as far as I can ascertain, still not much celebrated or even widely known about today. As Rowland White explains in his book Vulcan 607: “In 1961, RAF Bomber Command was invited to participate in SKYSHIELD, a major exercise designed to test North America’s sophisticated air defences. Eight Vulcans took part. Four, flying from Scotland, attacked from the north. The rest approached from the south out of Kindley Air Force Base in Bermuda. Preceded by American B-47s and B-52s, the northern component streamed in at 56,000 feet, a greater height than any of the defending USAF fighters could reach. One of the British bombers picked up the fire-control radar from an American F-101 Voodoo, but it was jammed by her AEO and she made it through unscathed. The other three were untouched.” It was of course the Vulcan’s ability to fly at speed at such altitudes which enabled the RAF to conduct spy missions over the Soviet Union to gather ‘intelligence’ for both the British and Americans.
“From the south, the four Vulcans spread themselves across a front 200 miles across. As the line approached the American east coast, the most southerly aircraft turned sharply north and, screened by electronic jamming from the three other bombers, staged a completely undetected mock attack on New York.” This was of course arguably the highest point of the British ‘V- bomber’ era and lack of investment by the British government, now focused on nuclear submarines carrying American Polaris missiles, meant that this type of deterrent went into sharp decline. So much so that when it was decided to mount a bombing attack at the start of the Falklands war, using just one Vulcan loaded with convential high explosive bombs, to attack the airfield at Port Stanley in 1982, equipment had to be recovered from scrap dealers, who, fortunately, hadn’t got around to recycling it.
The sheer amount of puffed up propaganda perpetuated by the Thatcher regime was quite breathtaking. Far from being ‘fit for purpose’ the entire exercise was very much a ‘wing and a prayer’ job. But, just like her ‘doppelganger’ Tony Blair, starving the military of resources made no impact on their decisions to wage war; in Blair's case two major wars. Both displayed a distinct propensity to act as presidents, verging on dictatorships in some respects, and both utterly devoted to supporting American policies, and, all of course with the possible exception of the Falkland Isles conflict, doomed to failure and leaving behind a huge humanitarian disaster that will take a very long time indeed; if ever (?) one might wonder, to clear up.
THE TRUTH IS SOMETIMES FAR STRANGER THAN FACT
I just could not resist including this. Elsewhere I have banged-on about the ineptitude of the RAFs senior officers, so often failing to apply basic common-sense management techniques. It was a mind-set that still applied during the 'Cold War', especially regarding the almost total failure of implementing procedures whereby everybody could contribute to the overall success of the running of an RAF Station.
Before relating this story it has to be borne in mind that the success of the 'V Force' acting as a deterrent relied almost totally on the QRA (Quick Reaction Alert) system which had a 'V' bomber fully fuelled and armed ready to go within fifteen minutes 24/7 365 days a year. In times of a heightened threat crews would live next door to their aircraft and, with the 'four minute' so called 'early-warning' radar system in place giving the alarm, they were expected to be airborne in less than this - for obvious reasons. A Vulcan B.2 could be airborne in two minutes - the crew chief getting the engines running as the aircrew travelled to the aircraft.
However, the entire success of the exercise - for a period in time - relied almost solely on the Morris J2 van, or minibus version, (then produced by British Leyland) - to get the aircrews from the QRA hut to their aircraft A vehicle regarded in civvy street as an utter pile of s**te. Now then please bear in mind that zillions of pounds, billions of man hours and endless training had gone into making this achievable. But somebody had decided that the Morris J2 was the ideal vehicle under these super-critical conditions when an all-out nuclear war was imminent. (If only that person could now be named and utterly shamed)
This most amusing account is by Phil Leckenby in the book Vulcan Boys by Tony Blackman, (highly recommended reading), from which I quote these excerpts: "During my time at Waddington the QRA wagons were changed or upgraded a number of times. The requirements were modest: it had to start without difficulty, accommodate a Vulcan crew of five with all their flying kit, sport a flashing blue light to distinguish it from more mundane road traffic and be capable of covering the short distances to the waiting aircraft."
"What the J2 lacked in elegance it more than made up for in temperament. The J2 could have been British Leyland's answer to the ubiquitous VW camper but for two small flaws." Just two! Phil is being far too kind. "...firstly, the woefully undersized engine was notoriously reluctant to start. even in a summer heat-wave it could be coaxed into life only with difficulty; in wet cold weather it was a toss-up as to whether the starter motor or battery would give up the unequal struggle first, leaving the frustrated crew no option but to run to the aircraft as best they could." Doesn't it make you proud to be British?
"The second trifling imperfection lay with the J2s column-mounted gear change. These vehicles endured a hard life in the sometimes uncaring hands of RAF drivers and the older the vehicle became , the more imprecise was the selection of its three forward gears. As the linkage became worn, first and second gears would become increasingly difficult to engage, leaving the driver with the option of kangarooing uncertainly forward in third or accelerating away in reverse." If only the Soviets knew - and quite possibly they did? Therefore rendering any attack quite impossible as they fell about laughing for hours on end knowing what might well be going on at some RAF 'V-bomber bases?
"I have an enduring memory of a particular QRA exercise which required us to board the aircraft, start up and taxi to the runway threshold, as close as we ever got to a practise scramble." Needless to say full scale 'scrambles' were often practised, and very spectacular they were. "As we ran out of the QRA hut, I caught sight of 50 Squadron's van lurching towards the dispersal in a cloud of blue smoke and a series of hesitant leaps. As we drove off in pursuit, I noticed 101 Squadron's van motionless in its parking slot, its blue light flashing in anticipation and anxious faces peering out of the windows; eventually it must have coughed into life because afterwards we were treated to the bizarre spectacle of their J2 accelerating away rapidly in reverse, weaving an uncertain path backwards to the awaiting aircraft."
A RECORD BREAKING FLIGHT
In the early 1960s, three Vulcans flew non-stop from WADDINGTON to Perth in Australia, being refuelled along the route by Vickers Valiant tankers based at RAF MARHAM. The flight time is given as 18hrs and 7mins.
Sixty years later Qantas announced they would, in March 2018, commence a non-stop service from London to Perth with the Boeing 787 Dreamliner, taking 17 hours. Obviously the 787 won't need air-to-air refuelling, but it has taken roughly another sixty years to get to this stage in aviation advances. But, perhaps it should be borne in mind that in 2016, you could fly from London to Perth in about twenty hours with one en-route stop.
A FEW FACTS ABOUT THE "FALKLANDS" VULCANS
I would be amongst the first to declare themselves a fan of this incredible aircraft, but, as usual, the reality doesn’t quite match the propaganda. As Rowland White points out in his excellent book Vulcan 607, by the time of the Falklands ‘conflict’ the Vulcan was on the point of being retired and only one made the attack on the islands to partially disable the runway airport at Port Stanley. The primary Vulcan had to turn back because the seal around the small DV (Direct Vision) window in the pilots cockpit had deteriorated to such an extent it couldn’t be properly closed. These aircraft were basically knackered and quite frankly not fit for purpose – something not exactly made plain to the population of Britain at the time.
“The first task was to select the ten bombers. Each of the four squadrons at Waddington had eight Vulcans on its strength. Although built in the 1960s using what was then cutting-edge technology, they were, in many respects, hand-built. There was little of the precision and uniformity that robots and computer-aided design would later bring to aircraft manufacture. Every aircraft displayed its own unique, individual set of characteristics. Some were happy flying slowly. Others became difficult below 155 knots. One turned well to the right, but needed full outboard aileron to control the bank in a left turn. Another had stiff throttles, but handled well. XM594 was reckoned, simply, to be ‘orrible’.”
I find, and I hope you do too, this to be a most interesting exposure. To put it into context I have flown about seventy different types of the four-seat Cessna 172 light aircraft ranging from nearly new to over forty years old. All had very similar flying characteristics and none displayed anything near to individual abnormalities. This said, purists would say the type handles so badly – who would know?
“It wasn’t just the airframes that needed to be considered either. The Navigation and Bombing System was also temperamental. Linked to the radar set, the analogue bombing computer had been a leap forward when it had been introduced. But then, it could hardly fail to have been, given the woeful inaccuracy of much of the Second World War technology it replaced. In the earliest days of that long war only three bombs in every hundred were believed to land within five miles of their target. The NBS, fed with figures for height, speed of aircraft, wind and the ballistic properties of the bomb itself, would calculate the forward throw of the bomb and, consequently, the point of release needed for the bombs to hit the target. It had always been good enough…..and….it didn’t actually matter if a nuclear bomb was a couple of hundred yards off the bulls-eye.”
Another good reason to read Vulcan 607. For the Vulcan crew to accurately bomb the runway at Port Stanley airport, using conventional high explosive bombs, the crews had to relearn the methods used by the very best precision bombers of WW2, in a matter of weeks. And, some of the equipment needed to carry these ‘conventional’ bombs was rescued from local scrap dealers. Yet again, hardly the picture portrayed to the British public regarding our ‘Air Supremacy’ when confronting the Argentinian forces.
THE COLD WAR ERA
WADDINGTON is as good a place as any to try and sum up what the ‘Cold War’ amounted to. Without any doubt whatsoever the greatest and arguably most useless squandering of resources the human race has ever seen, which, in the end, served no purpose for both sides. Unless, of course, you factor in the ‘deterrent’ element. In this respect it does seem proven that the RAF ‘punched well above its weight’ in terms of capability in the early days. After that it was the task of the Royal Navy.
Can we now imagine what, if the ‘Cold War’ hadn’t taken place, would be the result if all that money and resources had been intelligently channelled into social housing, heath care, education, enterprise support, transportation systems etc? I was of course sold the story that the Communists were the aggressors. However, over the decades it now appears the boot was on the other foot, and the USA was forcing the issue, certainly in military terms.
THE MARSHALL PLAN
The study of history seems to largely depend on whose version of events you happen to be reading. I was certainly surprised to learn that, if correct, the UK got as much financial support from the US ‘Marshall Plan’ as did Germany, but we struggled and frittered it away (to coin a convenient phrase), whilst the Germans forged ahead. This must prove something? Visiting Germany today it is also very clear that at some point, simply building new wasn’t the answer. Restoring their old buildings and town and city centres, and respecting their history was very much something to be valued and restored. In the UK, England especially, developers were determined to make a much better and thorough job of destroying our architectural heritage than the Luftwaffe in WW2 could only dream of. In this singular respect alone it does make me wonder what the 'V' bomber crews believed they were defending, as it certainly wasn't all good in Blighty.
IRONIC?
And how ironic it might appear that the two main protagonists had learnt nothing whatsoever about the utter futility of war, with both having been involved in WW2. The reason being, or so the propaganda went in those days, that we were in dire danger of being invaded by the Soviets. It seems that may well have been the case in 1945, but when the stalemate occurred with Allied and Soviet forces facing each other in Germany, it can be argued that the Soviets quickly gave up on that strategy. In fact I am now inclined to believe those who argue that it was the Soviets who were defending and the USA was the aggressor.
One principal reason being that the Soviets had suffered appalling massive casualties in WW2 whereas mainland America escaped attack. Both sides probably hadn’t realised it in the early days, but this phase in human history, of dominant nations forming huge ‘Empires’ controlled by military means was now finished. WW2 put paid to that in effect, but it took quite a long time before this concept became a reality.
A QUAINT NOTION?
Neither the Americans or Soviets had any idea about how wholesale modern war worth talking about should be fought, except that it had to be nuclear resulting in the total destruction of both sides and quite probably the entire world. An idea well worth pursuing according to what must surely have been certifiable idiots - scientists, and politicians, on both sides. Now that this threat has been greatly diminished, is it not utterly bizarre that anybody in their right mind should even contemplate such an utterly futile strategy?
STRUGGLING TO UNDERSTAND
As you can see I am still struggling to understand all of this. But, I do believe I am correct in thinking, that if no attempt to understand the history is applied, it is not possible to appreciate the real purpose of how such a significant ‘flying site’ such as WADDINGTON has functioned. For example, what sort of mind-set did the crews have during the height of the ‘Cold War’. Knowing that, in all probability they were on a suicide mission, or, if surviving the initial attack – they had no country worth returning to? Home and family and their society totally destroyed. So, what motivates somebody to think this is a ‘good idea’ and somehow beneficial?
GETTING BACK TO WADDINGTON
Another first for WADDINGTON is that 83 Squadron, based here, were the first to fly the Avro Vulcan operationally. This was in May 1957. 50 Squadron flew their Vulcan’s in the Falklands conflict, (looked like a war to me), and afterwards these were converted to air-to-air tankers. They were the last Squadron to fly Vulcan’s when disbanded here in 1984. The ‘Battle of the Falklands’ was of course all about having territorial rights to very valuable resources under the South Atlantic which had just been discovered following a major survey of the region.
One very important lesson was learnt during this conflict. Far from being a dominant military force on the world scene the combined might of all the British military services had one hell of a job to defeat the ‘Arggies’. It also proved that the fixation by ‘Cold War’ military strategists of always having like-for-like equipment proved that they didn’t have the bigger picture in focus. It seems to have been a ‘wake-up’ call when they discovered just what a formidable weapon the ‘obsolete’ Douglas Skyhawks operated by the Argentinians still were. Also, as so often happens in exporting aircraft solely on a sales basis, it must be ironic that the Argentine Air Force also employed English Electric Canberra’s the UK had sold to them!
A VERY ODD COINCIDENCE
In his book Vulcan 607 Rowland White explains that at WADDINGTON on the 29th April 1982: “Television camera crews were there for the occasion. Inside Waddington’s number 3 hangar IX Squadron was finally disbanding as a Vulcan squadron.” And, “Behind enormous sliding doors, a large audience sat under bunting and flags to watch the ceremony.” ……“There were speeches and reminiscences. Afterwards, the throng would move to number 2 hangar for a reception followed by lunch in the Officers’ Mess.”
And, whilst this was going on, three Vulcans were taxying out to fly to Ascension Island, their mission to bomb the Falkland Isles, although only one, XM607, would make the first raid on Port Stanley airport. “It wasn’t straightforward. They were leaving in strict radio silence. And although the 301 series Rolls-Royce Olympus engines had been uprated to run at 103 per cent rather than the usual 97.5 restriction, the jets were overloaded with fuel and bombs for the first time.” Needless to say all three made it off safely, but it is surely ironic that whilst a Vulcan squadron was being disbanded, three Vulcans from 44, 50 and 101 Squadrons were, unknown to most of the people attending the proceedings, (certainly all the press and media), about to depart on the longest bombing mission the world have ever witnessed up to that point in time. The operation was named BLACK BUCK.
BLACK BUCK FACTS AND FIGURES
To drop just one string of bombs on the Port Stanley airport, after departing from Ascension Island, in Avro 607 Rowland White gives these figures: “ They had needed one Nimrod, two Vulcans, thirteen Victors, nineteen separate in-flight refuellings, forty take-offs and landings, forty-two 1,000lb bombs, ninety aircrew and over 1.5 million pounds of aviation fuel.” But, “…the BLACK BUCK operation was the most ambitious and complex offensive operation the RAF had mounted since the end of the Second World War…” And, just to illustrate just how ‘efficient’ the RAF planning department were – at WADDINGTON, after the Vulcan XM607 had landed from its somewhat fraught raid on Port Stanley, Group Captain John Laycock finally received his copy of the Operation Order. Something regarding the wisdom of closing stable doors after the horse has bolted seems appropriate here!
It appears the three Vulcans that departed for Ascension Island were XM598, XM597 and XM607, the latter of course making that first raid captained by Flight Lieutenant Martin Withers, with Flying Officer Pete Taylor (Co-pilot), Flight Lieutenant Gordon Graham (Navigator), Flight Lieutenant Bob Wright (Navigator), Flight Lieutenant Hugh Prior, AEO (Air Electronics Officer) and Flight Lieutenant Dick Russell AARI (Air-toAir Refuelling Instructor). It appears that after the intial raid four more BLACK BUCK missions were mounted – two on Argentinian radar installations. In closing it seems fitting to mention that the Avro Vulcan, “… just months before it was destined for the scrapheap, entered the Guinness Book of Records for having flown, at nearly 8,000 miles, ‘the longest range attack in air history’. The Vulcans of 44 Squadron did soldier on until December 1982.
THIS IS HOW PROGRESS IS MADE?
In Avro 607 Rowland White makes this point regarding the Panavia Tornado supplanting the Vulcan as the RAFs new bomber: “On 8 November 1982, in conditions of great secrecy, one of Strike Command’s recently acquired Panavia Tornado GR.1s, accompanied by a Buccaneer S2, took part in exercise STORM TRAIL. The aim was to demonstrate the offensive reach of the new strike jet by staging a mock attack on RAF Akrotiri in Cyrprus from the UK. The Tornado took off from RAF Marham. Strict conditions on the air-to-air refuelling were put in place – not above 28,000 feet and not in cloud – because the Tornado’s anti-icing systems weren’t fully operational. Both limits had to be busted in order for the mission to succeed. At times, the Tornado, always asthmatic at altitude, had to rely on the Victor tankers supporting the mission to shepherd it along. It made it there and back, though. Just. But the Tornado’s warload on STORM TRAIL was a tiny fraction of that carried the Vulcans on the BLACK BUCK missions; the distance from the UK to Cyprus, barely 2,000 miles.”
Looked at in a long term picture it does seem akin to the MoD/RAF top brass in WW2 saying, “I’ll tell you what, forget those long range Lancasters we have – lets replace them with Bristol Blenheims.” And, in an odd way, they were right because modern wars were going to be fought in a tight and contained area, often with an enemy indistinguishable from the civilian population.
THE ‘SUDSMOBILE’ TECHNIQUE
According to an entry in Wikipedia: “In August 1960, the station developed the sudsmobile technique to lay a 1,000 yd x 30 yd (914 m x27 m) carpet of foam in around a half-hour for a wheels-up landing. Previously it had taken around three hours to lay a foam carpet on the runway. A Canberra from RAF Wyton landed wheels-up on 23 August 1960, with a Victor managing the same of 5 December 1960.” Since then?
Talking of ‘suds’ there was a female peace camp outside the Station during 1982, for five months it seems. No doubt many of those brave and determined women would have appreciated a bath or shower more often than they managed.
WADDINGTON’S SENTRY ERA
From the mid-1980s a number of NATO Boeing AWACS appeared here, on deployment from their main base at Geilenkirchen in West Germany. It wasn’t until 1991, or thereabouts, that the first of the RAF Boeing E-3F Sentry (AWACS) arrived. I’m showing my age and not keeping up. It appears these ‘AWACS’ E-3F Sentry’s are now augmented with Raytheon Sentinel R1 ASTOR types. It all beats me - bring back the Shackleton I’d say! This said it appears this small fleet of E-3F Sentry’s is, and has been, performing little known by highly significant role in the control of NATO Forces. Typically, (am I showing bias?) often supporting US led aggression (or if you prefer – peacekeeping duties). In North Africa for example, the RAF AWACs acted as command posts for NATO aerial forces in the Libyan conflict which defeated the Colonel Gaddafi regime.
What I do find very interesting is how the Americans can re-invent very old airframe concepts and keep them up-to-date, which is of course hardly a set-back when 99% of “the enemy” today does not possess an aircraft. For example the Boeing B-52 Stratofortress first flew on the 15th April 1952 and is expected to remain in service until the 2040s. The Boeing E-3 Sentry AWACS, KC-135 tanker and RC-135W Rivet Joint are all based on the Boeing 707 airliner airframe which first flew on the 20th December 1957. The Beechcraft Shadow R1 is based on the Super King Air which first flew on the 27th October 1972, and, this type itself bore a strong family semblance to the original King Air dating back to its first flight in May 1963.
(My note: I do of course realise that the British Nimrod can easily trace its roots to the DH.106 Comet which first flew in July 1949)
The Raytheon Sentinel R1 seems almost ridiculously new by comparison, but this is based on the Bombardier Global Express which first flew on the 13th Oct 1996 – hardly a ‘golden-oldie’ compared to the American types above – but, in 2014 when I made these notes, that was eighteen years ago. The American types mentioned are all very good examples of how so much of aircraft design dramatically changed quite quickly after WW2 when the ‘jet-age’ erupted onto the scene, and, in some cases can still stand the test of time, (albeit highly modified), sixty-five years later.
By comparison WADDINGTON saw the Avro Lancaster serve very capably in WW2. The ‘Lanc’ first flew on the 9th January 1941, was in service operationally just thirteen months later, soon became a favourite and a classic, but, by the late 1940s, including the later Lincoln derivative, had reached its ‘sell-by’ date. The first of the jet powered V-bombers, the Vickers Valiant, first flew on the 18th May 1951 and entered service in 1955. And, could out-perform the best RAF fighter of that time – the Hawker Hunter. Surely modern aircraft designers and manufacturers must long for the days when you could get a classic type from first flight to operational status in just thirteen months?
IS THIS CORRECT?
Even by the early 1950s the basic principles of nearly all aerodynamic theory had been established. Indeed the Concorde SST project was first mooted at this time. Ever since it has been a case of endless research and fine tuning. No really major advance in the knowledge of how aeroplanes work, or should I say fly (?), has occurred since. Perhaps for the very simple reason that the laws of physics remain the same – at least when it comes to aeroplanes flying through our incredibly thin atmosphere. They can fly at up to 80,000ft (just15 miles) and that is about it. One very specialised design, the NASA Dryden Helios solar-powered and pilotless aircraft did reach 100,000 feet, and maintained altitude, but had no use except for research.
Experimental aircraft types can ‘zoom climb’ quite a bit higher. On the 22nd August 1963 Joseph A Walker, flying an X-15, got to 354,199 feet (67 miles) setting an unofficial altitude record. Forty one years later Brian Binnie had another go flying the Scaled Composites SpaceshipOne on the 4th October 2004, reaching 367,441 feet (69.59 miles) – but this was, in nearly all respects – a spaceship.
What has occurred is a quite incredible revolution in aircraft operating systems, ‘fly-by-wire’ being arguably the most significant single advance? Advances in navigation equipment would leave WW2 navigators utterly astonished. Having INS (Inertial Navigation System) and GPS (Global Positioning System) was something not even dreamt about. Once computers were accepted as being reliable, they changed aviation forever.
IN CONCLUSION
I find it quite remarkable that a site such as WADDINGTON, (there are just a few others of course), can trace an almost straight-through history from the era of wood and fabric types in World War One to the present day, having aircraft based here which represent the pinnacle of advances in avionics. And of course, this all being achieved in less than a century.
CHD Dev
This comment was written on: 2015-07-27 11:45:47I note a comment on your website which I find rather offensive! "But what to do about Northern Ireland? Frankly I still dont have an answer. It probably isnt a good answer, but within the constraints of producing a Guide to British flying sites, I decided to mark the fact that in many peoples opinion this area still isnt a legitimate part of the United Kingdom by ignoring the Counties and treating the area as a whole instead. In this way it marks it out as being very separate from the rest of the UK which I think is both deserved and sensible? It is only a token gesture of course but it does have the benefit of graphically illustrating that this province of the UK should be generally regarded as being totally different or seperate." Be strongly advised that the "United Kingdom" is "The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland". Very disappointing. What an ignorant statement! On this basis I assume the same applies to Scotland and Wales?
Reply from Dick Flute:
Many thanks for pointing this out. It was written when I started this project some fifteen years ago and I now regret not having reviewed it since. Something that I shall address very soon. This said, the situation N.I. has certainly improved considerably since - but that is no excuse. I would like to add that I am indebted to Lee Merritt, who designed this web-site for adding a comments section so that blunders such as this can be highlighted. Mt best regards, Dick
We'd love to hear from you, so please scroll down to leave a comment!
Leave a comment ...
Copyright (c) UK Airfield Guide
